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nitely described the shares which she intended complainant to have
and assumed that these shares, after the increase in the whole number
of shares, would pass to complainant in their changed form of 3 to 1." 5
In In Re Fitch's Will,46 the New York court clearly indicated that
intention, rather than classification, was to be the controlling factor.
The testator there disposed of all his stocks which he owned when he
executed his will. Before his death, but after the stocks had been
disposed of, there was a three for one stock split. The court held the
legacies to be general and therefore not adeemed. However, the court
also determined that the legatees were entitled to not only the original
number of shares of stock named in the will, but also the additional
shares resulting from the split. Thus, they held that both general and
specific legatees may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to ad47
ditional stock split shares.
The Illinois Court, in affirming the lower court's decision in this
case, stated: "that in the absence of an intention to the contrary, a
legatee of shares of stock is entitled to additional shares issued as a
result of a stock split occurring after execution of the will.

'4

1

Thus, Illinois, appearing to be one of the jurisdictions which does
not feel bound to classify bequests, seems to put into actual practice
the idea that: "The guiding principle in the interpretation of any will
is the intention of the testator, which is another way of admonishing
the court to keep in mind that the business at hand is determining
49
what the testator willed by his will."
ROBERT EARL KUELTHAU

Bills and Notes: Indorsee of Check After Eight-Day Delay in
Negotiation as Holder in Due Course-Question of Law or FactA check was drawn in payment of the price of a truck sold by payee
to drawer. Drawer, drawee, and payee all maintained their principal
offices within a ten mile radius of each other, and within the same
county. Some four to eight days after issuance, drawer stopped payment, claiming misrepresentation respecting the quality of the truck.
Payee, on the eighth day after issuance, cashed the check at the plaintiff bank, which was not the drawee. Upon prompt presentment to
drawee, payment was refused. Action was brought against drawer,
45 See supra note 38, at 263.
46281 App. Div. 65, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 234, 235 (3rd Dept. 1952).
47In re McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759, 762, 763 (1950).
In
this case, the Pennsylvania court similarly found that although the legacy
was general, the legatee was entitled to increase resulting from a stock split.
The court there stated: ". . . that the intention of the testator governs concerning identity or value of a legacy; that what the testatrix manifestly

48

intended was to bequeath to each legatee 50 shares of the stock as it was at
the time of the making of the will, the equivalent of which was 125 shares
as of the time of death."
See supra note 38, at 265.

49 Id. at 262.
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and the due course status' of the plaintiff denied generally in the
answer, the answer also alleging the claimed misrepresentation in the
transaction of issuance. 2 Plaintiff moved for summary judgment ;3
and, on denial of such motion, appealed. Reversed: "It is a matter
of common knowledge of which this court may take judicial notice
that banks and stores frequently cash checks which are more than
eight days old. Surely eight days is not such an unreasonable delay
in the presentment of a check as to make the check obviously stale."
Home Savings Bank v. Bentley, 5 Wis. 2d 19, 92 N.W. 2d 377 (1958).
The governing statute on the issue of the above appeal reads as
follows :4
When an instrument payable on demand is negotiated an
unreasonable length of time after its issue, the holder is not
deemed a holder in due course.
The statutes further provide a general guide for construction of the
critical words of said statute :5
1

"A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title
of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among
themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount
thereof against all parties liable thereon... ." N.I.L. 57, Wis. STAT. §116.62

(1957).

"In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable
instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable."
N.I.L. 58, Wis. STAT. §116.63 (1957).
"A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under
the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular on its face;
(2) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice
that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (3) That he
took it in good faith and for value; (4) That at the time it was negotiated
to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
person negotiating it." N.I.L. 52.
Wisconsin adds a subdivision reading: "(5) That he took it in the usual
course of business." WIs STAT. §116.57 (1957).
2 Failure of consideration between the original parties is no defense against
a holder in due course. N.I.L. 28, Wis. STAT. §116.33 (1957). See also 5
UNIFOR1M LAWS ANNOTATED §57.

"Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when
it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument
was defective, the burden is upon the holder to prove that he or some person
under whom he claims acquired the title as holder in due course." N.I.L. 59,
Wis. STAT. §116.64 (1957).

In an action to enforce payment of a check on which payment was stopped by
the maker, the burden of proof was upon the bank which obtained the check
from the payee to show that it was an innocent holder for value. Union Nat.
Bank v. Fox, 24 Tenn. App. 664, 148 S.W. 2d 381 (1941).
3A summary judgment is not to be granted in a situation where the evidentiary facts set forth in the affidavits filed in support of the motion for summary judgment fail to touch upon a material issue raised by the pleadings.
Hermann v. Lake Mills, 275 Wis. 537, 82 N.W. 2d 167 (1957).
The plaintiff's affidavits in the principal case, so far as they disclosed the

circumstances of plaintiff's taking the check, recited only that: ". . . on the
26th day of July, 1957, the defendant . . . presented to me at the Home

Savings Bank a check dated July 18, 1957, and drawn on the Cudahy State
Bank . . .; that I paid five hundred and 00/100 ($500.00) dollars cash to the
defendant." This affidavit was signed by a clerk in the plaintiff's bank.
4N.I.L. 53 and Wis. STAT. §116.58 (1957).
5N.I.L. 193 and Wis. STAT. §116.01(15) (1957).
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In determining what is a "reasonable time" or an "unreasonable time" regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument,
the usuage of the trade or business (if any) with respect to
such instruments, and the facts of the particular case.
It is widely held that the question of reasonableness of time is ordinarily one of fact, dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances7
6
surrounding the delay. Accordingly, in applying the same statute
or one closely related thereto and using the same critical word," the
courts have reached varying conclusions under difference circumstances. 9
Isolated cases have ruled the question as a matter of law, ordi1
narily under extreme circumstances. O
6 "Thus, the question: what is a reasonable time, involves questions of fact,
usually for the jury under proper instructions." BRITTON, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES §120 (1943).

In Coolidge v. Rueth, 209 Wis. 458, 245 N.W. 186 (1932), the Wisconsin Court
said that what constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact. Mars, Inc.
v. Chubrilo, 216 Wis. 313, 257 N.W. 157 (1934).
The New Jersey court held that whether delay in the negotiation of a check
involved an unreasonable length of time was a question of fact for the jury
and not a strict question of law. First Nat. Bank at Glendale v. Sussex County
Airport, 137 N.J.L. 667,61 A. 2d 206 (1948).
"The facts in each particular case must be taken as the test for that case."
Clarinda Sales Co. v. Radio Sales Pavilion, 227 Iowa 671, 288 N.W. 923
(1939).
See also 5 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED §186, n47.
7N.I.L. 53 and Wis STAT. 116.58 (1957).
8N.I.L. 186 and Wis. STAT. §118.62 (1957). "A check must be presented
for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay."
9 Ordinarily what constitutes a reasonable time for presentment is a question
of fact, but where it is indisputable that the route by which the check was
sent for presentment was not the most direct, the question is one of law.
Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo, supra note 6.
In Coolidge v. Rueth, supra note 6, the check was issued to an attorney in
Madison. The same day he mailed it to his client at his client's home in
Davidson, Michigan. The check was then forwarded by the Davidson bank for
collection, but the drawee bank had closed on the previous day. Held that in
view of the facts the delay was not unreasonable.
In Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen, 134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451 (1908) a
delay of thirty-eight days was declared not to be unreasonable in view of the
facts of this particular case.
A delay of five days was held reasonable when the payee had no chance to
get to the bank before five days unless she left work to do so. Peterson v.
School Dist. No. 14, Roseau County, 162 Minn. 357, 203 N.W. 46 (1925).
For additional cases see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED 586, 1140, and 1183 (1932).
10The Wisconsin court in Coolidge v.

Rueth, supra note 6, said: "A rule has
grown-up requiring the payee to present a check before the close of the next
business day where the bank is located in the same place in which the payee
lives ... "
A check held for approximately twelve years after issue was held an unreasonable delay as a matter of law. Weaver v. Harrell, 115 W. Va. 409, 176
S.E. 608 (1934).
Where payee and drawee are in the same town a delay of one week is unreasonable as a matter of law. Parker v. Grau, 188 Ark. 1016, 68 S.W¥. 2d
1023 (1934).
For additional cases pertaining to notes 9 and 10, see 5 UNIFORm LAWS
ANNOTATED §53, nn. 2 and 8; §186, nn. 48-57, 64-5.
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Anderson v. Elem"3 cited and relied upon by the Wisconsin Court
in the principal case, though appearing from the quoted portion to
state its rule as a matter of law, actually was not decided on that basis.
While the indorsee accepted the check twenty-four days after issuance,
he did so from an indorser-payee whom he knew to be a traveling
man. The indorsee was not located in the same locality as the drawer
or drawee bank. The Kansas trial court found the indorsee to be a
holder in due course after a full trial at which all of the facts were
disclosed. The Kansas Supreme Court merely affirmed this finding;
so that the case actually turned upon its factual circumstances tending
to support the trial court's finding. In the Wisconsin case none of
the facts explanatory of the eight day delay in negotiation were divulged
either at the trial or appellate level.
The circumstantial factors which have, in the majority of cases,
been held to require a determination of the question as one of fact
are extremely varied.12 But, the underlying principle which supplies
the significance of such factors is fundamentally the requirement that
a holder in due course must take the instrument in "good faith," more
accurately, since Goodman v. Harvey1 3 and under N.I.L. 56,14 the
absence of bad faith. The term "commercial bad faith" and the term
"ordinary course of business" suggest taking into account the commercial experience and custom of the person whose qualification as a holder
in due course is under investigation, as compared with others in the
same or similar businesses.' 5
11111 Kan. 713, 208 Pac. 753 (1922).
12A

demand note given by the maker to his brother was negotiated four and

one half years later. The question of reasonableness under N.I.L. 53 and
193 was for the jury to decide. The court said that the jury finding of reasonableness should not be disturbed. Gershmann v. Adelman, 135 Atl. 688 (N.J.
1927).
A draft presented thirty eight days after issuance was held to be duly presented to charge the payee where the payee indorsed it to a man he knew
to be a traveler. Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen, supra note 9.
A delay of seven days was held unreasonable because the payee could as
readily have selected a more direct route in presenting. Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo,

supra note 6.

A delay of ten days was allowed where the payee lived out of state. Coolidge
v. Rueth, supra note 9.
23 4 Ad. & El. 870 (1836).
34 Wis. STAT. §116.61 (1957).
"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person
to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity
or defect or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith."
135"The neglect to make inquiry under the circumstances was more than mere
negligence. It was a lack of commercial good faith. The knowledge which
he had was sufficient to prevent the acquisition of the paper by commercially
honest men." Bergheim v. McRae, 190 Minn. 571, 252 N.W. 833 (1934). "The
effort is always to ascertain whether the person whose actions are inquired
into exercised that degree of both intelligence and uprightness which is
deemed necessary to uphold the commercial morals of the community without
unduly impairing the intended easy negotiability of promissory paper." Gerseta
Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir. 1924).
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Of all of the factors which have given rise to difficulty in determining a transferee's bad faith, the most troublesome has been a lack
of inquiry in the face of variously suspicious circumstances. Of these
circumstances, a delay in renegotiation after issuance is but one, and
never exists in total isolation. In the principal case, the delay itself
was typically coupled with other circumstances, which included (1)
the fact that all parties resided in close proximity to each other; (2)
the fact that, somewhat uncommonly, the indorser requested cash for
the check, rather than the more usual account-credit; (3) the fact that
the check was comparatively substantial in amount; (4) the fact that
the plaintiff bank apparently placed no reliance on the credit of the
drawer, and was not specially acquainted with the drawer; (5) the fact
that, from all that the record discloses, utterly no inquiry was made
prior to taking the check, and no circumstance suggesting a reasonable
explanation of the delay itself was apparent. 16
To take judicial notice of the alleged common practice of cashing
checks which are more than eight days old, as did the court in the
principal case, is simply to hold that such delay is not an unreasonable
one under every conceivable set of circumstances, a proposition for
which there is more than ample authoritative support. But such
proposition logically fails to support its converse: that such delay is a
reasonable one under every conceivable set of circumstances, a proposition for which there is a marked paucity of support in both the cases
and the authorities.
The essence of the rule for which the principal case stands is that
a delay in negotiation of a check (if not of other types of demand
paper) is a circumstance to be considered largely in isolation from
the other circumstances confronting the taker at the time he surrenders
value for the paper. To be significant, or even to be inquiry-provoking,
such delay must be sufficient to characterize the paper as "obviously
stale."
It is to be doubted that such a rule tends to promote the recognized
objectives of the Uniform Act in respect either to uniformity or to
certainty in the law of bills and notes. 17 Just as different triers of
fact, giving consideration to all of the circumstances surrounding a
negotiation, may differ in their findings as to the ultimate reasonableIt was commercial bad faith for an experienced banker to cash a check for a
man who had no account at the bank without first inquiring as to the validity
of the check with the drawee bank. Miles City Bank v. Askin, 257 P. 2d
896 (Mont. 1953).
17 "The adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act by nearly every state of the
Union resulted from a belief that a uniform law upon the subject approximated in importance a national currency system, and it was passed for the
purpose of harmonizing and making uniform the law upon a subject concerning which there was much disagreement, giving rise to embarrassment and
confusion in the commercial world. The end thus attained should not be
frittered away by conflicting judicial interpretations of the act." Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1930).
16
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ness or good faith of the taker, so also may different appellate tribunals
disagree as to when paper becomes "obviously stale." It is not suggested, presumably, that "staleness" is a matter to be determined solely
on the basis of whether or not "banks and stores frequently cash
checks" older than a given number of days; for, if that were true, the
time requirements of N.I.L. 53 and 186 would descend to the level of
the poorest practice of merchants, and thereby be virtually extinguished.
But neither, on the other hand, can the word "'stale" be applied to the
problem literally or objetively, as signifying a state of physical dehydration. s
The preferable course would probably have been to follow the
established current of authority in submitting the question of good
faith to the trier of fact for determination under all of the circumstances, giving to his determination of the ultimate question the usual
weight and significance. The ultimate outcome of the case might well
have been the same, but the uniform law of the subject would thereby
have been spared a highly dubious source of future confusion.
Tom SAWYER
Conflict of Laws: Law of Domicile as Controlling Over Interspousal Immunity Rule of Place of Wrong-A woman, allegedly
the wife of the driver, was injured in a vehicle being operated in
California. The alleged husband and wife were at that time domiciled in Wisconsin. The wife brought an action in Wisconsin against
the driver and his insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that, under California law,'
one spouse is immune from suit in tort by the other spouse. On
appeal, reversed:
38

"Stale: being in some stage of decay, as meat or egg
of dryness, as bread

. . ."

. . .

being in a state

FUNK & WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY

(1946) ;
"Inthe language of the courts of equity, a 'stale' claim or demand is one
which has not been pressed or asserted for so long a time that the owner
or creditor is chargeable with laches, and that changes occurring meanwhile
in the relative situation of the parties, or the intervention of new interests
or equities, would render the enforcement of the claim or demand against
conscience." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933).

The literal application of these definitions would tend to permit almost any
period of delay, under the court's rule in the principal case.
1 Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73
Cal. App. 2d 437, 166 P. 2d 387 (1946); Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App. 2d
589, 235 P. 2d 422 (1951). There is no specific California statute on this
subject, the cases holding that the common law immunity is preserved under
the familiar married women's property acts, except in property litigation.
2 The principal case expressly overrules "at least six prior decisions of this
court:" Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931); Forbes v.
Forbes, 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 122 (1938); Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231
Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939); Garlin v. Garlin, 260 Wis. 187, 50 N.W.
2d 373 (1951); Scholle v. Home Mutual Casualty Co., 273 Wis. 387, 78 N.W.
2d 902 (1956) ; Hansen v. Hansen, 274 Wis. 262, 80 N.W. 2d 320 (1956) ; and
"partially overrules two others:" Nelson v. American Employer's Insurance

